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Abstract. Thousands of malicious applications targeting mobile devices, 
including the popular Android platform, are created every day. A large number 
of those applications are created by a small number of professional underground 
actors, however previous studies overlooked such information as a feature in 
detecting and classifying malware, and in attributing malware to creators. 
Guided by this insight, we propose a method to improve on the performance of 
Android malware detection by incorporating the creator's information as a 
feature and classify malicious applications into similar groups. We developed a 
system that implements this method in practice. Our system enables fast 
detection of malware by using creator information such as serial number of 
certificate. Additionally, it analyzes malicious behaviors and permissions to 
increase detection accuracy. The system also can classify malware based on 
similarity scoring. Finally, we showed detection and classification performance 
with 98% and 90% accuracy respectively. 
Keywords: Mobile malware, Android security, malware detection, malware 
classification, creator information 
1 Introduction 
Mobile devices, especially smartphones, made a great contribution toward 
environment of fast and massive information sharing. Smartphone market is 
expanding consistently every year, enriching our digital lives in the sense of 
communication and entertainment. However, the increase of usage of mobile device 
caused a serious problem at the same time. McAfee collected 2.47 million new mobile 
malware samples and total 3.73 million malware samples in 2013. The malware 
totaled at the end of 2013 increased by nearly 200% from the end of 2012 [1]. 
Mobile malware mainly targets Android platform. The reason is that Android user 
occupies the largest part of the mobile market, and unfortunately, the platform allows 
easy distribution of malware created or repackaged as well. There were 827 new 
families or variants of mobile malware collected in 2013 by F-Secure. They reported 
that most of the families were based on Android platform; exclusive of 23 families 
only [2]. Also, 275 new Android threats (new families or new variants) with only two 
threats of other mobile platforms have collected by them [15]. 
In order to mitigate the threat on mobile device, various efforts have been made to 
detect and analyze mobile malware. There are two main approaches, static analysis 
and dynamic analysis. Many studies of static analysis use requested permission to 
check the risk of an application, but the methods of only permission-based have its 
limits to detect malware accurately. There are also other detection methods analyzing 
other features such as API instead of permission. Different from static analysis, 
dynamic analysis usually deals with features like dynamic code loading and system 
call that can be collected while an application is running. 
While process of signing the application is required before distribution, a 
certificate may be a clue to trace the developer. Applications are often attributed to 
their developers using certificates tied to the developer’s signing credentials, although 
investigating certificate’s information has not been actively studied yet. Very 
recently, Jerome et al. [23] used certificates signing malware to isolate applications as 
a potential malware set, which showed the possibility of filtering malware with a 
predefined list of malicious certificates. We hypothesized that certain developers have 
a significant role in the creation and distribution of malicious apps. Indeed, we found 
that only 4% of total certificates collected from malware are signing as much as 70% 
of the malware samples discussed in this paper. 
Our proposed system provides a light-weight malware detector using serial 
numbers of certificates and similarity-based malware classifier. To this end, the 
contributions of this work are as follows: 
• Our system contains malware detection method using static analysis associated 
with creator information. The system uses serial numbers of certificates, getting 
light-weighted process to detect malware. Also, it analyzes particular parts of 
applications based on functionality and permission, and achieved high detection 
accuracy. 
• Based on similarity scoring algorithm, our system classifies malware into same 
expected families. The algorithm compares API sequence, permissions, and system 
commands extracted from malware. Grouping similar malware samples and 
demonstrating signature of each group can help to figure out a number of samples. 
• We automated our proposed system and experimented on collected real samples; 
51,179 benign applications and 4,554 malware samples. It determined most of the 
applications correctly only except 454 applications (less than 1% of all samples). 
Then, the system classified malware families by gathering them with 90% accuracy 
tested on the applications decided as malware from preceding detection process. 
• We analyzed distributions of certificates signing applications of our dataset 
samples. Benign application sets and malware sets are compared based on the 
number of applications and malware families created by each certificate. 
 
 
 
2 Related Works 
There are mainly two approaches to analyze Android malware: static analysis and 
dynamic analysis. Static analysis is a way to check functionalities and maliciousness 
of an application by analyzing its source code, without executing the application. It is 
useful for finding malicious behaviors that may not operate until the particular 
condition occurs. On the other hand, dynamic analysis is a method to examine an 
application during runtime. It may miss some parts of the code that not executed, but 
it can easily reveal certain malicious behaviors too complicated to find by static 
analysis. 
Table 1. Related works on Android malware analysis 
Method Main Features Papers 
Static 
analysis 
Requested permission 
[4], [6], 
[12], [13] 
Requested permission, Android component [3] 
Dynamic 
analysis 
Presence of root exploits, use of encryption,  
dynamic code loading 
[7] 
API call, system call [9] 
System call, system log [14] 
System call [11] 
Hybrid 
analysis 
Requested permission, behavioral footprint, 
dynamic code loading 
[5] 
API call sequence, dynamic code loading [8] 
Requested permission, intent, native API call [10] 
 
Analyzing the requested permissions is one of the popular ways in static analysis. 
An application asks users for permissions before installation, so it notifies to the user 
what information and resources the application can access. Enck et al. [3] proposes a 
security service system, named Kirin, which certificates an application at the moment 
of installing, using a set of predefined security rules. They analyze the type of 
malicious behaviors and defined the rules configured with permission and intent 
information. AdDroid system separates privilege from advertising framework to 
Android platform [4]. It prevents advertising library to access sensitive information 
allowed for other permission of the application. Felt et al. [6] analyze real-world 
mobile malware from 2009 to 2011. Also, they discuss effectiveness of using 
permission distribution in order to classify benign application and malware. Peng et 
al. [12] applies simple Naïve Bayes to requested permissions, and develop 
hierarchical mixture model. Also, Sarma et al. [13] compares distribution of 
permissions between benign application and malware, then determine critical 
permissions to detect malware. Both [12], [13] studies propose a risk-scoring method 
for applications using their own algorithms. Permission based malware detection 
model’s major weakness is low accuracy. The problem arises from the laxity of 
Android permission architecture. Application developers can request permissions that 
are not necessary; the distribution of permissions becomes incorrect. 
On the other hand, there are dynamic analysis based approaches. RiskRanker is an 
automated system that detects particular malicious behaviors [7]. First, it checks 
whether native code of an application contains the known exploit codes or not. 
Secondly, it captures certain behaviors like encryption or dynamic code loading. 
AppsPlayground performs functions like information leakage detection, sensitive API 
monitoring, and kernel level monitoring [9]. Burguera et al. [11] propose a system 
named Crowdroid that monitors and logs system call and send it to a central server. 
At the server side, the system operates K-means clustering to classify benign app and 
malware. Jang et al. [14] analyze integrated system logs including system calls, 
generated while malware running on an emulator. Their system, Andro-profiler, 
makes a behavior profile with analyzed system logs in human-readable form. By 
comparing it with the predefined profiles of malware families, it can detect and 
classify malware with high accuracy. 
There are also hybrid approaches that adopt both static analysis and dynamic 
analysis. Zhou et al. [5] detect malware samples of known families with permission 
based behavioral footprinting scheme. They manually analyze and abstract essential 
malicious behaviors as footprints to complement permission based analysis. The 
paper also includes heuristic based filtering scheme to detect samples of unknown 
malicious families, which mainly monitors dynamic code loading. Another paper that 
applied both analyses explains previous signature based approaches are not effective 
since a signature like cryptographic hash can be easily changed by malware developer 
[8]. They extract API call sequence and check dynamic downloading of malicious 
code, then generate three levels of signatures. These signatures facilitate identifying 
malicious code segment, along with class association among applications. 
Spreitzenbarth et al. [10] presents an automated analyzing system, Mobile-Sandbox, 
combines static and dynamic analysis. It parses an application’s permission and intent 
information and analyzes the suspiciousness of them. Then, it performs dynamic 
analysis to log actions especially those based on native API calls. 
3 Proposed System for Detecting and Classifying Android 
Malware 
3.1 Android platform and malware 
3.1.1 Features of Android applications 
In this section, we explain features of Android platform we mainly used in 
profiling applications. The Android OS has a distinctive structure. Applications on 
Android do not have a unique entry that programs usually have on other OS. They are 
made up of Android components; activity, service, broadcast receiver, and content 
provider. Activity is a UI component related to the screen while service is a 
background process which is invisible to the user. Broadcast receiver waits for the 
signals from the system and wakes up the proper actions after receiving. Content 
provider plays a role of an intermediate unit to share data between applications. These 
four components work individually, therefore a unit for delivering messages is 
needed; namely intent. Intent transfers from activity to activity, containing specific 
instructions about what the application wants. 
API (Application Programming Interface), documented in Android SDK, is a set of 
functions provided to control principal actions of Android OS. It is much efficient to 
consider certain APIs often used by malware, rather than extracting all APIs from the 
source code of an application. Seo et al. [17] analyzed malware samples and 
determined suspicious APIs often used by malware. They listed suspicious APIs and 
compared the number of use between malware and benign applications. We manually 
collected additional APIs by checking all APIs in Android SDK, which operate in a 
way similar to the suspicious APIs defined in [17]. These APIs are related to 
functions such as collecting the user or device information, accessing websites, 
sending and deleting SMS, and installing an application. 
122 permissions are provided in Android platform to inform the user what actions 
will be performed and which resources will be accessed by an application. Sarma et 
al. [13] compared two dataset, applications from the Android Market and malicious 
applications. They analyzed the distribution of permissions requested by each dataset 
and found 26 risky permissions to the security and privacy. Peng et al. [12] used the 
critical permissions applying Naive Bayes Models to score risk of an application. We 
use those permissions in our system. One of the permissions, INTERNET, is 
excluded, since this permission is required for most applications. We regarded that 
relatively small difference between the percent of applications requested from 
Android market applications and malware will not play an important role in detection 
and classification. INSTALL_PACKAGES, a permission usually used for installing a 
new package downloaded from a server, is included instead. While requested 
permissions are notified before download, there is another way to extract permissions 
by analyzing call-graph. Au et al. [18] specified the list of permissions required by 
every API call, and provided the permission mappings. In our system, we extracted 26 
critical permissions applying PScout mapping, along with requested permission. We 
named this feature as API-related permission. 
When distributing an application, the creator signs it by his private key and a 
standard certificate of the public key is generated. There are blanks for the creator's 
name, organization, and location, while generating a certificate. However, the creator 
can fill them up with false information since the process has no steps of confirmation. 
The certificate has a unique serial number according to RFC 2459, the X.509 
standard. Based on that, one can check whether certificates are the same or not by 
comparing the serial number. We hypothesize that there may be frequently-detected 
serial numbers in various malware variants, and analyzed the results in this paper. 
3.1.2 Threats from Android malware 
Malware can infect Android devices via many infection routes; as a downloaded 
application from visits to malicious websites, spam, malicious SMS messages, and 
malware-bearing advertisements [1]. After malware infects a target device, behaviors 
of the malware can be categorized depending on their purpose. Zhou and Jiang [16] 
classified malicious behaviors into privilege escalation, remote control, financial 
charge, and information collection. Also, Seo et al. [17] listed monetization, 
information stealing, mobile botnet, and root privilege acquisition as categories. 
Through examining these behaviors, we rearranged those to particular functions to 
use in our malware detector module; the functions are using system commands on 
root privilege, causing financial fraud by hiding SMS notification from the user, and 
collecting sensitive information. 
3.2 Detecting and classifying malware 
We designed a system for detecting and classifying Android malware. Fig. 1 shows 
the overall architecture of the system. It is composed of three parts; parser module, 
malware detector module, and malware classifier module. First, the parser module 
extracts strings like certificate information, APIs, permissions, commands, and intents 
from an application. Then, the malware detector module checks whether a certificate 
serial number of the application is included in a predefined serial number blacklist. If 
not, it additionally analyzes the application based on other features like APIs, intents, 
system commands, and permissions. Finally, the malware classifier module groups 
malware with same families by comparing the similarity of API sequence, 
permissions, and system commands between the applications. The parsed data and 
outputs of detector and classifier modules are updated in a shared database. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of proposed system 
 
We collected malware samples from malware repository websites such as 
VirusShare [19], Contagio Mobile [20], and Malware.lu [21]. The samples are 
collected during January to August 2013. We used malware description of F-Secure 
antivirus to tag representative family association and labels. Based on the F-Secure 
antivirus description, malware families that include too many samples were cut down, 
and families that have only few samples were excluded. The number of refined 
malware samples is 4,554. Also, we collected 51,179 applications during the same 
period by downloading from the Android market, GooglePlay, and assumed that they 
are benign.* 
3.2.1 Serial number blacklist 
Among the collected malware samples, we extracted a serial number of each 
sample's certificate. 622 serial numbers were observed in total malware samples, but 
only 24 unique serial numbers comprised 70% of the samples, and surprisingly, 50% 
of malware samples were signed by five serial numbers. That means particular serial 
numbers are frequently used by malware creators. However, the counted number of 
malware signed by the same certificate serial number may have an error, because the 
counted number depends on the collected samples. In addition, we analyzed 
commonly found serial numbers in the various malware families and their variants. 
Among the 622 serial numbers, there were 137 numbers that generated more than 2 
families or variants of malware. There were 485 numbers that generate only one kind 
of families or variants. Rest of serial numbers used to create many malware families 
or variants, and the number of families or variants varied from 2 to 11. 
We made a blacklist of serial numbers from the resulting certificates. The serial 
numbers creating only one type of malware were excluded from the blacklist. The 
serial numbers found in over two malware families or variants were included. 
‘93:6e:ac:be:07:f2:01:df’ was deleted in the list, since it is a serial number of standard 
test key for native applications that are built in a device or an emulator. As a result, 
the serial number blacklist had 136 numbers for malware detection. 
3.2.2 Likelihood ratio of permission 
Benign applications and malware groups have different tendencies of requesting 
permissions. Malware can request more permissions than benign applications, or can 
often request permissions that have risks related to the privacy problem or financial 
fraud. We analyzed the distribution of the critical permissions in each benign 
application sample and malware samples we have, to calculate likelihoods of the 
permission. 
Table 2. Critical permission distribution in benign applications and malware samples (%) 
Permission 
Requested API-related 
Benign 
app 
Malware 
Benign 
app 
Malware 
                                                           
*  Our dataset is available at http://ocslab.hksecurity.net/andro-tracker 
Permission 
Requested API-related 
Benign 
app 
Malware 
Benign 
app 
Malware 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 16.61 53.78 20.52 56.28 
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 16.96 51.89 17.72 55.82 
CALL_PHONE 6.57 26.92 0 0 
INSTALL_PACKAGES 0.32 12.67 0 0 
PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS 0.63 1.80 0 0 
READ_CONTACTS 5.82 24.95 1.72 0.22 
READ_SMS 1.22 27.82 0 0 
SEND_SMS 1.82 43.98 1.04 35.07 
WRITE_CONTACTS 2.08 1.47 1.72 0.22 
BLUETOOTH 1.51 4.04 1.21 2.37 
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN 1.21 2.77 0.95 0.53 
GET_ACCOUNTS 4.40 4.90 3.39 3.67 
MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS 0.80 20.62 0 0 
NFC 0.26 0.04 0.15 0 
READ_CALENDAR 0.97 0.04 0 0 
READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS 0.93 7.88 0.25 5.64 
READ_LOGS 1.39 28.59 0 0 
READ_PHONE_STATE 24.10 96.55 12.00 69.19 
RECEIVE_MMS 0.20 1.05 0 0 
RECEIVE_SMS 1.66 37.66 0 0 
RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH 0.05 3.01 0 0 
RECORD_AUDIO 3.13 22.20 2.53 27.84 
WRITE_CALENDAR 0.85 0 0 0 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 32.25 82.50 0.10 0.68 
WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS 0.57 7.07 0.04 0.02 
WRITE_SMS 0.77 5.67 0 0 
 
Table 2 shows the ratios of the permissions for each category, requested and API-
related, by benign samples and malicious samples. The likelihood of permission on 
each category can be calculated by Naïve Bayes Classifier. The permissions should be 
relatively independent to multiply each probability of permission. Au et al. [18] found 
out that most of the Android permissions have subtle correlation with any other 
permission. They recognized only 15 pairs of permissions have small dependency in 
all permission set. The critical permissions we used are not included in these pairs so 
we can assume that they are relatively independent. 
Let n and m be number of applications and number of critical permissions 
respectively. The permission vector for application 𝑖  is 𝑎𝑖 = (𝑎𝑖,1, 𝑎𝑖,2, ⋯ , 𝑎𝑖,𝑚) , 
where 
𝑎𝑖,𝑗 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑖𝑛 𝑗
0,  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
. 
Also, we put 𝑐𝑖 ∈ {benign, malicious} which indicates category of the application 
𝑖. Then,  
P(𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖) = P(𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖,1, 𝑎𝑖,2, ⋯ , 𝑎𝑖,𝑚) = ∏ P(𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖,𝑗)
𝑚
𝑗=1
. 
Using Bayes’ Theorem, the conditional probability of category 𝑐𝑖  given variable 
𝑎𝑖,𝑗 which informs the usage of permission can be written as  
P(𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖,𝑗) =
P(𝑎𝑖,𝑗|𝑐𝑖) ∙ P(𝑐𝑖)
P(𝑎𝑖,𝑗)
. 
Then, ratio of probabilities is  
P(𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠|𝑎𝑖,𝑗)
P(𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑛|𝑎𝑖,𝑗)
=
P(𝑎𝑖,𝑗|𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠) ∙ P(𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠)
P(𝑎𝑖,𝑗|𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑛) ∙ P(𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑛)
. 
We assume P(𝑐𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠) = P(𝑐𝑖 = 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑛); it is a situation of having no 
information about the category of the application, so the application is supposed to 
have a variable of any category value following uniform distribution. By multiplying 
probabilities of 𝑚 permissions, the likelihood ratio Λ is 
Λ(𝑎𝑖) =
P(𝑐𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠|𝑎𝑖)
P(𝑐𝑖 = 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑛|𝑎𝑖)
= ∏
P(𝑎𝑖,𝑗|𝑐𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠)
P(𝑎𝑖,𝑗|𝑐𝑖 = 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑛)
𝑚
𝑗=1
. 
Malware can be detected by comparing likelihood ratio with some predefined 
threshold value 𝑇𝐿. 
If one of the conditional probabilities is zero, then the whole multiplication 
becomes zero. To avoid such case, the conditional probabilities are calculated using 
the Laplace estimation, 
P(𝑎𝑖,𝑗|𝑐𝑖) =
∑ 𝑎𝑖,𝑗 + 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛 + 2
. 
3.2.3 Malware detection 
In the previous section, we defined the representative malicious behaviors using 
the root privileged system commands, concealing SMS notification to charge rate, and 
so forth. These kinds of well-known malicious behaviors can be detected by our 
system. It uses the serial number of certificates as one of the features to detect 
Android malware. Also, permission based rule is applied as one of the detection rules. 
Our detection algorithm is designed with mainly three ideas: 1. existence of certain 
serial numbers generating many kinds of malware, 2. malicious behaviors like 
command usage on root privilege, hiding SMS notification, and collecting sensitive 
information, and 3. high likelihood of malware under given distribution of 
permissions. 
The detection algorithm starts by checking the application’s serial number of a 
certificate for fast scanning by applying the blacklist we established in the previous 
section. There were a few applications that have serial number in the blacklist but do 
not use any suspicious APIs. The step excludes them to avoid over-detecting. 
Secondly, the algorithm checks the usage of the system commands. Seo et al. [17] 
listed commonly used commands by malware. We listed them by excluding the 
commands used only in a few malware samples. ‘chmod’, ‘insmod’, ‘su’, ‘mount’, 
‘sh’, ‘killall’, ‘reboot’, ‘mkdir’, ‘getprop’, ‘ln’, and ‘ps’ are commands often used by 
malware, and they run on rooted Android device. If any of those strings is found in 
the source code of an application, we mark it as malware. The commands are 
executed after the malware obtains root privilege on the device. Also, our list contains 
‘gingerbreak’ and ‘rageagainstthecage’ because they are root exploits. These 
commands, which run on rooted device or to root a device, are found in malicious 
codes. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Detection algorithm 
 
The next step is finding malware that conceals SMS notification. Malware that 
behaves in this way has a purpose of subscribing to premium services confirming and 
noticing by SMS. These applications use sendTextMessage() to send SMS. Also, we 
checked specific intent information to detect malware which conceals SMS 
notification. Some malware receive notification of SMS with the highest priority, and 
then make the message not delivered to other applications. They get the highest 
Input: App 
Output: result ∈ {benign, malicious} 
 
if SN ∈ SN Blacklist and ∃ suspicious API then 
 result = malicious 
else 
if ∄ suspicious API 
  result = benign 
else if ∃ malicious command then 
result = malicious 
else if conceal SMS == true then 
result = malicious 
else if likelihood ratio of requested permission > T and 
likelihood ratio of API-related permission > T and 
collect suspicious information == true then 
result = malicious 
else 
result = benign 
end if 
end if 
priority of SMS receiving intent and call abortBroadcast() to hide a notification of 
SMS to other applications and users. This malicious behavior can be found by 
searching the intents. The step checks whether an application uses above methods and 
an intent filter, to catch such malware. 
For the final step, the algorithm adopts a permission based detection rule. It 
calculates likelihood ratio under given distribution of permissions. Two likelihood 
ratios are obtained using requested critical permissions and API-related critical 
permissions. To complement a limitation of permission based detection method, it 
checks whether an application sends SMS or collects sensitive information like device 
ID, phone number, serial number of SIM card, and location of the device. In 
specifically, sendTextMessage() is checked for sending SMS, and getDeviceId(), 
getLine1Number(), getSimSerialNumber(), and getLastKnownLocation() are checked 
for collecting sensitive information. Collecting more than two kinds of the 
information is considered sufficiently suspicious. 
3.2.4 Similarity scoring and malware classification 
Malware applications detected by our malware detector are fed into the malware 
classifier module. Suspicious API strings, malicious commands, and critical 
permissions are used for similarity scoring. These features are chosen because they 
are highly related to the behavior of malware. 
Similarity score between two malware is computed by using each similarity 𝑆𝑖  of 
suspicious API string, malicious commands, and critical permissions. The similarity 
score 𝑆𝑆 can be written by 
𝑆𝑆 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ 𝑆𝑖
𝑖
 
where 𝑤𝑖 is a weight of relevant similarity, and ∑ 𝑤𝑖 = 1𝑖 . For all 𝑖, 𝑤𝑖 = 1/3 to set up 
same weights to three similarities. 
All suspicious API are substituted by a matched character. The suspicious API 
string of an application, which is made of substituted characters in parsed order, 
reflects the calling sequence of APIs. The similarity between two strings is calculated 
by using Needleman-Wunsch algorithm that finds the best sharing alignment of two 
sequences. 
The similarity of malicious commands is measured by applying the Jaccard 
coefficient. The Jaccard coefficient computes the number of elements 
in the intersection divided by the number of elements in the union. The order of the 
malicious commands is not under consideration. 
The critical permissions are compared by using the Levenshtein distance. This 
metric calculates a minimum number of character edits to make two strings same. It is 
meaningless to consider the order of permissions, so we applied the Levenshtein 
distance after sorting the strings. A value of similarity is calculated as the number of 
edits over the maximum length of two strings. Each similarity of requested 
permissions and API-related permissions is computed, and the average of two values 
is used for the similarity of critical permissions. 
Our classifier module makes groups of similar malware by comparing between a 
malicious application's signature and each group's signature. A signature is a set of 
suspicious API string, malicious commands, and requested/API-related permissions 
of a malicious application. In the case of a group, it is same as the signature of the 
first application included in the group. A sample loaded into the system is treated as 
follows: 
1. A similarity score is computed between signatures of the sample and the existing 
group. The score is computed with all existing groups, each. 
2. The highest value of similarity scores, max (SS), is chosen. 
3. The chosen value is compared with similarity threshold 𝑇𝑆. If max(SS) ≥ 𝑇𝑆, the 
sample is included in the corresponding group. If max(SS) < 𝑇𝑆, the sample results 
in a new group, and the signature of it represents the group's signature. 
4 Experiment Results and Discussion 
We implemented our system developed by Python 2.7 using the algorithms we 
proposed. It is tested on collected dataset mentioned at the beginning of section 3.2. 
We applied 5-fold cross-validation to test our system. Samples are randomly divided 
into five equal size subsamples. Only one subsample is used as test data, and it repeats 
for five times to check for all each subsample. The accuracy is computed by 
averaging the five results. 
4.1 Extracting elements 
An APK, which is an Android package, is a compressed file that contains META-
INF, lib, res, and assets directories and AndroidManifest.xml, classes.dex, and 
resources.arsc files. Serial number is extracted from META-INF directory that 
includes information of the certificate. From AndroidManifest.xml, the application 
name, requested permission, component and intent can be collected. Classes.dex file 
is disassembled to obtain a smali code, which is a Dalvik virtual machine code. By 
following the codes used by components, the system extracts suspicious API, 
malicious command, and API-related permission. These elements are saved in a 
database that provides necessary data to detector module and classifier module. 
4.2 Serial number distribution 
The distribution of serial numbers between benign samples and malware samples 
shows clear difference. Serial numbers found in only one application comprise the 
most parts of total serial numbers found in the benign dataset. The frequency of serial 
numbers used in benign applications decreases rapidly when number of application 
signed increases. In malware sample dataset, serial numbers that signs more than one 
application comprise larger proportion than those found in benign samples. Indeed, 
the average number of application signed was 1.65 in benign dataset (which includes 
51,179 samples), and 7.32 in malware dataset (which includes 4,554 samples). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Frequency of serial number found in sample dataset 
As we mentioned when deciding the serial number blacklist in section 3.2.1, we 
considered the number of malware families is more important than the number of 
applications signed in the sense of maliciousness of a serial number. We analyzed 
how many malware families or variants are observed from each serial number. Table 
3 shows the result. ‘93:6e:ac:be:07:f2:01:df’ and ‘b3:99:80:86:d0:56:cf:fa’ are deleted 
from the set, since these numbers can’t indicate specific malware creator. They are 
standard test keys for native applications which are built in a device or an emulator. 
The two keys, namely the test key and the platform key, are used for signing in order 
to develop the native applications. In 620 serial numbers, there were 484 numbers that 
generate only one kind of families or variants. Rest of 136 serial numbers created 
multiple malware families or variants. Malware dataset shows a significant trend of 
certificates sharing. It implies that malicious apps may have produced by professional 
malware creators. 
 
Table 3. Number of serial numbers according to number of number of malware families 
Number of malware family 
(including variants) 
Number of SN 
(except test keys) 
1 484 
2 107 
3 13 
4 12 
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4.3 Detection and classification results 
The system was configured with the threshold values 𝑇𝐿 = 1  and 𝑇𝑆 = 0.7 . It is 
reasonable to set 𝑇𝐿 as 1 since this implies that the likelihood of malware is bigger 
than the likelihood of benign application. Also, we assumed that 0.7 for 𝑇𝑆  is 
sufficiently high to determine two signatures are similar. 
423 benign applications, corresponding to 0.83% of all benign application, were 
detected as malware. A majority of false positives were detected by the serial number 
blacklist. On the other hand, the false negatives, measured as malicious samples 
predicted as benign, were only nine. From the point of view of malware analyst, it is 
important to have low false negatives, although increased false positives may be 
annoying. The rule may be a bit ‘loose’ for accurate detection. However, this 
substantially reduces false negatives. To find out why some of the benign applications 
were determined as malicious in our system, we checked the 423 false positives using 
descriptions from VirusTotal [22], a popular malware scanning site. Interestingly, 329 
applications were reported as malware. It implies that applications downloaded from 
GooglePlay are not perfectly reliable as benign. The descriptions of false positives 
were applied to offset the classification result. 
Table 4. Confusion matrix of malware detection results 
Category 
Predicted Class 
Malicious Benign 
Actual Class 
Malicious 4,545 (TP) 9 (FN) 
Benign 423 (FP) 50,756 (TN) 
 
The classification accuracy of each category is analyzed in Table 5. Accuracy in 
the table is defined as correctly classified samples in the category divided by the 
number of all samples the category contains. The average of malware classification 
accuracy is 90%, and the average of total is 98%. Each test set of cross-validation, 
which contains 11,146 or 11,147 samples, was divided into 65 groups by classifier 
module on average. About 30 groups of them included less than 10 samples. 
According to the category comprising the maximum portion of group, samples of 
different category are false positives. 
Applications in categories like Adwo, Boxer, FakeApp, FakeBattScar, Smshider, 
and SMStado were classified with high accuracy. However, performance of 
classifying sample sets like DroidDream, PremiumSMS, and SmsSend were low. The 
main reason was an overlap of malicious behavior. For example, SmsSend sample 
which is another version of OpFake according to the analysis of F-Secure, often 
classified as OpFake or Boxer because sending a message is a common function of 
them. 
We conducted an experiment to estimate the detection accuracy without using the 
SN blacklist to see the effectiveness of the blacklist. Without SN blacklist, the 
detection accuracy was 98%, which shows difference of only 1% in the result of the 
detection with the full SN blacklist. Analyzing time (except parsing and classification 
process) is increased from 400 seconds to 579 seconds. Consequently, this result 
shows that the well-collected SN blacklist mainly boost the speed of malware 
detection (30.9% faster) with slightly enhanced accuracy. 
Table 5. Classification results for each category 
Category 
Number of 
Samples 
Accuracy 
Malware 
AdWo 1,910 0.97 
AirPush 243 0.76 
Boxer 755 0.99 
Counterclank 68 0.68 
DroidDream 14 0.57 
DroidKungFu 24 0.79 
FakeApp 17 0.94 
FakeBattScar 82 1.00 
FakeInst 709 0.88 
FakeNotify 82 0.82 
Gappusin 153 0.65 
GinMaster 115 0.72 
Kmin 48 0.88 
OpFake 130 0.65 
PremiumSMS 25 0.44 
Ropin 64 0.66 
Smshider 17 1.00 
SmsReg 14 0.64 
SmsSend 10 0.00 
SMStado 74 0.97 
Average (malware) 4,554 0.90 
Benign application 51,179 0.99 
Average (total) 55,733 0.98 
 
4.4 Performance evaluation 
To demonstrate the performance, our system was compared with other systems: 
Andro-profiler [14] and Crowdroid [11]. They are classification systems using system 
call based on dynamic analysis. The experiment was conducted with samples used in 
the study of Andro-profiler. They used 709 malware and 350 benign applications. The 
performance was compared focusing on classification accuracy and speed. The 
number next to malware families implies the sample size. 
Our system detects and classifies malware much better than Crowdroid, though it 
has slightly lower accuracy than Andro-profiler. Still, the system was implemented on 
larger dataset including more kinds of malware families, and it was carried out 
successfully with Andro-profiler's dataset at the same time. 
Also, we checked the processing time of our system and Andro-profiler. The 
testing environment was set as Intel(R) Xeon(R) X5660 with 4GB RAM and 
Windows 7 Enterprise K operating system. To run Andro-profiler, the system takes 
55 seconds/MB to analyze malware excluding setting time of an emulator (an added 
overhead). Our system performed at a speed of 72 seconds/MB. Considering dynamic 
analysis needs time for booting emulator between testing each sample, our system 
spends reasonable time for analysis. 
Table 6. Comparing classification accuracy with Andro-profiler and Crowdroid 
Category 
Proposed 
system 
Andro-
profiler 
Crowdroid 
Malware 
AdWo(401) 1.00 1.00 0.54 
AirPush(60) 0.98 0.95 0.02 
Boxer(42) 1.00 1.00 0.43 
FakeBattScar(51) 0.96 1.00 0.18 
FakeNotify(59) 1.00 1.00 0.80 
GinMaster(96) 0.99 1.00 0.11 
Benign application(350) 0.88 0.97 0.35 
Average 0.96 0.99 0.35 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed an Android malware detection and classification system 
based on static analysis by using serial number information from the certificate as a 
feature. It mainly checks a serial number, checks suspicious behavior of SMS hiding, 
detects the malicious system commands in the code, and analyzes the suspicious 
permission requests. As a result, our system can detect malware with 98% of 
accuracy. The classifier module can classify the 20 kinds of malware families with 
90% accuracy. Additionally, the system can help analysts to react efficiently from 
Android malware's threats by detecting and classifying with high accuracy in a 
reasonable time (72 seconds/MB). 
In the future, we will enhance our system by adding dynamic analysis functionality 
to overcome the general drawback of static analysis based system. 
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